Edited Interview. Food Donations After Disasters and in Relation to Agricultural Development. by Cuny, Frederick C.
EDITED INTERVIEW
FOOD DONATIONS AFTER DISASTERS AND 
IN RELATION TO AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT
with Frederick C. Cuny, Executive 
Director, INTERTECT, Dallas, Texas
Antigua Guatemala 
February 28th, 1977
INTERVIEW
SUBJECT: 
WITH:
INTERVIEWERS:
)
PLACE:
DATE:
EDITED TRANSCRIPT:
Q:
A:
Role of PL480 and other food donations after 
disasters and in relation to agricultural 
development.
Frederick C . Cuny
Executive Director
INTERTECT
P. 0. Box 10502
Dallas, Texas 75207 USA
Mr. Cuny is a registered city planner in the 
State of Texas, with an extensive background 
in civil engineering and architecture. He has 
a degree in development studies, with concentra­
tion in Africa and Latin America. He is former 
Visiting Professor of Engineering and Public 
Affairs at Carnegie-Mellon University, Pittsburgh.
INTERTECT is an international cooperative of 
architects, engineers and planners who provide 
specialized.services to international relief 
organizations in disasters and emergency 
situations.
Robert Gersony, Jo Froman, Tony Jackson, who are 
conducting an inquiry into the appropriateness of 
PL480 food assistance in Guatemala.
Address: 4a. Avenida Sur No. 4
Antigua Guatemala, C. A.
Antigua Guatemala
February 28th, 1977
Fred, what practical experience do you and 
INTERTECT have in disaster and development work?
We’ve worked in Biafra; in India in 1971 for the 
Bengali refugees fleeing East Pakistan. We have 
worked in Bangladesh, Israel, Lebanon, Burundi,
Nicaragua, Honduras, and recently in Guatemala, 
and Peru.
Q: We would like to concentrate this morning on
your experience with the donation of food in 
these situations. Can you review for us the 
nature and effect of any food distribution 
which was made during the relief efforts in 
which you participated directly?
A: OK.
Biafra
The first disaster I worked in where food was an 
issue was in Biafra in 1969. The Nigerian forces 
had surrounded the enclave known as Biafra, the 
province which was attempting to break away from • 
Nigeria. The international relief agencies, such 
as Church World Service and CARITAS, responded by 
flying massive amounts of food supplies into the 
area in old airliners to attempt to alleviate the 
widespread starvation, especially malnutrition and 
kwashiorkor which was beginning to affect the infant 
population.
The major foods that were brought in were bulk foods 
such as flour, and some of the new high-protein foods 
developed about that time, including CSM (Corn/Soya/ 
Milk blend), fishmeal, bulgur wheat, and WSB (Whey 
Soy Blend).
The aircraft landed at the two makeshift airstrips 
at Uli and Enugu, where some of it was turned over 
to the Biafran Army. They were supposed to take it 
out to the numerous distribution centers throughout 
the country, but the vast majority of it was distri­
buted at the incoming centers. So a major effect of 
the airlift of food and medical supplies was to 
increase the number of refugees who came to the 
distribution points.
The real degree of starvation was never fully ascer­
tained by the relief agencies. They tried several 
surveys, and as a result they developed the QUAC
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(Quaker Arm Circumference) Stick which is now one 
of the major ways of examining malnutrition in 
children.
The primary issue for the international agencies was 
feeding the large number of children. A lot of people 
who knew that most of the agencies were trying to help 
the orphans would bring their kids near the centers 
and then abandon them, hoping that they would be taken 
care of. The rush toward the centers got so bad that 
eventually the agencies decided to fly the children 
out of there. They put them on the planes that came
in to drop the food and then flew them out to neigh­
boring countries. So I think the feeding programs 
broke up the families. One of the big political 
problems in Western Africa was the return of these 
children to their former families after the war.
I studied the airlift of the International Committee 
of the Red Cross in Dahomey figuring out faster ways
of getting the food in after the war was over. It
was expected that there was going to be widespread 
starvation after the war and that the Nigerian Army 
was going to retaliate against the Biafrans. In 
fact, they didn!t. After the fighting was over, the 
people were able to go back into the rural areas and 
start planting and living off the land again, and the 
fears of the widespread starvation never materialized.
From what I saw at the Uli airstrip, there was a tre­
mendous amount of starvation in the children and it 
was a serious problem. But how much the actual 
relief effort itself contributed to that I think is 
something that no one really knows.
My own feelings are that bringing in the food enabled, 
the gun-running operations to keep going. The 
Biafrans were really top-notch public-relations 
people. They set up a public-relations firm in New 
York to handle this, and they went out and took 
pictures of starving enclaves of children and broad­
cast them to the world. The food issue was used as 
a means of keeping a corridor open for planes to fly 
in. For every relief plane, there were at least two 
gun-running planes which went in, thus prolonging
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the war. So you can say fairly well that the 
relief operations there prolonged the war and 
increased the misery.
East India
The next relief operation in which I was involved 
where food was a major issue was in the refugee 
camps in East India in 1971. It was a case where 
feeding was very essential to keeping the refugees 
alive.
As the refugees from East Pakistan crossed the border, 
they went into West Bengal, one of the most populous 
areas in India where the Indians could hardly sustain 
themselves. Because of a lot of political problems, 
the State of West Bengal had been under martial law 
for several years. There was a separatist movement 
there and the Indian Government didn't want to do 
anything to encourage West Bengal's sentiments of 
separatism.
So for political reasons, they were forced to put 
the East Pakistan refugees into camps. Because of 
the extreme overpopulation in the area, the only 
land that was available for the camps was the worst 
possible land, and the sites were subject to flooding; 
had poor sanitation; and there were no means for the 
refugees to grow food. All the food had to be 
supplied by foreign voluntary agencies. They were 
even prohibited by military order from working in 
the camps. Technically you couldn't use refugees 
even to build their own houses. They were just 
supposed to sit there.
We found that in the camps which had any kind, of land 
and water, people tried to flood sections of the camp 
to plant rice. They went into fish-farming as well. 
For poor, rural people in developing countries, their 
whole life struggle revolves around staying alive by 
feeding themselves. We found that in the refugee 
camps, the guys who could plant a small plot and get 
it going really had a tremendous amount of stature 
within the community and were really proud of the 
little things they could get out of there. When you 
stop people fending for themselves, you deny them
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their main source of self-esteem.
The farmers here in Guatemala are very proud of 
the corn they can bring in, just as proud as 
Iowa farmers, and, you know, for a foreign agency 
to come in and take that main activity, that main 
source of self-esteem away is just asking for 
problems.
Qi What was the idea behind having these people sitting
around the camps idle all day when there was work 
which they could be doing?
A: Well they figured that if any types of organiza­
tions got started they would very quickly become 
political organizations which could put a lot of 
pressure on the Government. Already, the Govern­
ment was trying to provide houses for 12 million 
refugees —  shelters, not houses —  while in 
Calcutta alone there were estimated 500,000 to 2 
million people who were homeless and living on the 
streets.
The Government was confronted with a real political 
problem: if it provided for these refugees, people
in Calcutta itself could say, ,TWhy aren’t you 
providing for us?n
The Government also knew that a lot of the refugees 
were actually people from West Bengal who were home­
less and came in thinking that they would get free 
food and medicine. They didn’t want them getting 
organized either.
There were actual Government officials who went 
around breaking up political or social action 
committees which had been formed in the camps, 
especially near Calcutta.
But the question of feeding - getting back to that - 
was really a major problem because the refugees 
couldn’t grow enough food in the camps. India 
already had a food shortage that year in the area 
where the refugees were going: West Bengal, Bihar, 
and, over on the other side of what was then East 
Pakistan, the Agartala region. There had been a
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drought in Bihar the previous year which wiped 
out the food reserves there. Rice production was 
way off in Eastern India. So India was already 
importing food and they finally just said, "The 
only way we can continue to feed the refugees is 
to get international aid."
At that point, massive food supplies, primarily 
rice and wheat, began arriving through the World 
Food Program (FAO), OXFAM, United States surplus 
foods, probably through PL480. Canada and Australia 
together probably donated the largest amount of 
food. It still wasn’t enough to go around.
There was a lot of in-fighting among the agencies 
about the proper type of food, how to prepare it, 
and so on. Some really drastic schemes were 
proposed for distributing food.
The food that was brought in had to be mixed with 
water, and the water was so unsafe that it just 
increased the disease, especially in the children, 
unless it was strictly supervised.
The conditions are hard to describe: In some cases,
you actually had to line people up in battalions; 
sit them down, and force feed them. The apathy 
that had set in because they were not allowed to 
work was devastating, and in some camps people 
wouldn’t even walk to the feeding lines.
Bangladesh
As soon as the war ended and Bangladesh was established, 
the refugees were issued their travel certificates, 
put on the railroads, shipped to the border, and 
dropped. However, many did not know where to go: 
there were thousands of families -- millions of 
people -- many of whom had left East Pakistan in 
refugee flights or had escaped during the fighting, 
gotten lost, and wandered into India. They had been 
relocated there, and had no concept of where their 
villages were. So graclually most of these people 
gravitated toward the major cities of Bangladesh: 
Chittagong, Dacca, Jess ore, looking for employment.
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Some of the organizations, such as CARE and 
UNICEF, which had already been working in East 
Pakistan before Independence, set up again quickly 
in the major cities when it became Bangladesh.
So people also gravitated to the cities to get 
food from them until they could find out where 
they were going.
Now I don’t know how that could have been prevented. 
Certainly the agencies that were working there when 
the war ended, and immediately afterwards, had an 
important role to play, because there was very 
little left of the Government. When the West 
Pakistanis pulled out, they took the money and all 
the means of Government. They shot something like 
15,000 public officials, industrial managers, any­
one with leadership and left the country in com­
plete chaos. Into this leadership vacuum came the 
relief agencies, providing all the assistance they 
could.
But what they ended up doing was building up a 
dependency relationship on foreign resources. The 
Indians pulled out very quickly, saying that the 
Bengalis would have to stand on their own feet.
The agencies should have done the same damned 
thing.
Instead, they continued to work there. So that now, 
the idea of having a foreign advisor has permeated 
the entire Bengali society, all the way down to the 
village level, to the point where nobody makes 
decisions unless it’s been OK’d by a foreigner, and 
the foreigners are much less equipped than the 
Bengalis to run Bangladesh.
Nobody is looking at the overall needs of the 
country, least of all the Bengalis themselves. 
There’s as much chaos today as there was at the 
end of the war. Each agency has its own master 
plan: one agency stresses feeding and nutrition;
another housing; another education; and each 
village evolves differently as a result.
It’s affected the Government’s ability to develop 
national plans which will increase food production.
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Before the war, it was a food exporting country.
The war disrupted it and set it back. The 
agencies came in, creating more chaos, and gra­
dually food production went down. There was no 
effort to get people back into production. The 
effort was in trying to feed people.
So what happened is that the more they fed people, 
the less the market value of the rice. The 
villagers increasingly said, "We can7t sell our 
food, so we won’t grow it this year.” They would 
end up migrating to the cities and it became a 
vicious circle.
The more food production dropped, the more the 
agencies brought in. By 1975, it was so chaotic 
that the World Food Program Director, Trevor Page, 
asked donor countries to stop sending food. In a- 
report which he produced, he questioned, I think 
for the first time, the relationship between the 
amount of food which the agencies brought in and 
the deterioration of food production. He stated 
in a meeting that the more food that comes in, 
the greater the level of starvation appears to 
become.
Also in 1975, the Bangladesh Field Director of 
the 11. S. Save-The-Children agency resigned because 
of the effect aid, including food, was having on 
the country. During this period, there was a 
general re-examination by many people of the 
issue of bringing in food during a relief operation.
There was so much donated rice, wheat and CSM in 
Bangladesh that the ports were completely jammed. 
Jute and other products couldn’t be exported; food 
seeds and other urgently needed materials couldn’t 
be imported. Many people, dependent on these 
imports or exports, lost their jobs and businesses 
went out, causing an increase in the level of 
poverty and starvation in the country. The main 
effect of the food imports, however, was that 
they lowered the price the farmer got for his 
crop. Bengali farmers began to sell their food to 
marketeers who smuggled it to India where they 
could make a bigger profit. This too, reduced the 
total food availability in Bangladesh.
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Nicaragua
The next relief operation I had contact with in 
terms of food was the Managua, Nicaragua earth­
quake which occurred around Christmas, 1972.
After the earthquake I was working with OXFAM, 
the largest private British overseas development 
group, and the Catholic Institute for Inter­
national Relations, a British volunteer group..
I was working with them on setting up a relief 
program in one of the refugee camps in the town 
of Masaya. The Nicaraguan Government had done a 
very stupid thing: they had expelled a tremen­
dous number of people from the inner-city and 
ordered them to go into the surrounding areas.
They so over-loaded the small towns that they 
created additional relief problems for them­
selves .
So the international agencies ran in and said,
,rThe people need food," and they began blasting 
the food into Nicaragua in another airlift, main­
ly food provided by the United States and brought 
in by the U. S. Army Southern Command. The French 
sent food in via Martinique, and British charities 
sent several loads of food.
I was asked to fly around to various places in 
Latin America looking for sources of food. When 
OXFAM Field Director Reggie Norton arrived, we 
sat down and talked. We felt that there was pro­
bably enough food in Nicaragua which we could buy 
to provide for the refugees.
Nevertheless, I went on the trip around Latin Ame­
rica with a fellow named Julian Filochowski, and 
we found that there were adequate resources in 
Latin America. When we got back to Nicaragua, 
Rejjie Norton had already determined that there 
were tremendous food resources there. So we said, 
"If we need to buy, wekll buy locally and cut off 
the imported food aid."
Q : Is food usually available in disaster areas?
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A: We found in all the major disasters that there was 
always enough food in the surrounding area to take 
care of the needs. There was never a need to 
import foods from the industrialized countries.
The surrounding area can be broadly defined. But 
let’s say that in Managua there was enough food 
in Nicaragua. In Guatemala, if there had really 
been a need for it, there would have been enough 
food in Central America. For Biafra, there was 
enough food in the neighboring countries. After 
the war, there was enough in Nigeria to meet the 
Biafrans’ needs. There was also enough food in 
the area around Bangladesh. Very rarely after a 
disaster do you need to import foods at all. I’d 
say it’s virtually non-existent. It’s not a food 
problem - it’s a distribution problem.
There are times, however, when food importation is 
necessary. First, when people are cut off from 
their markets by a war or civil disturbance.
Second, when refugees from outside move into an 
area where there is a drought or where food short­
ages already exist. It must be stressed, however, 
that the need to import food to a disaster area 
does not mean importing it from the U.S. or Europe; 
it means importing it from nearby.
Q: In that case, what about importing food during non­
disaster periods?
A: Obviously, if in a disaster you can find the food
around, you should be able to do it in a non-disaster 
period.
Q: What was the attitude of the Somoza Government in
Nicaragua toward the international assistance after 
the earthquake in Managua?
A: During the first few days, the Government of Nica­
ragua tried all sorts of incredible things to screw 
the relief agencies. When I arrived, they wanted 
to charge me a fantastic landing fee for my airplane. 
In any disaster, a relief plane marked with a red 
cross is exempt from any kind of landing fees or 
taxes. They wanted to charge me a dollar a pound, 
and I just refused to pay it.
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Then a U. S. Air Force C-97 arrived loaded with 
relief goods, and they wanted to charge them not 
only a dollar a pound for the relief goods, but a 
dollar a pound for the whole plane, which would 
have been something like US$200,000 - 300,000 
just for landing at the airport. And the Air 
Force guys just said, you know, "Stick it where 
the sun don’t shine,” and threatened to take off 
with a load of reporters taking the relief 
supplies back to Iowa where they had been donated.
Most of the stuff which came into Managua was 
totally useless. There were loads of electric 
frying pans and stuff like this, and the Somoza 
Government took a lot of the materials down to a 
hangar at the end of the strip, which happened to 
be Somoza’s, for sorting. A lot of the people 
thought it was going down there because Somoza was 
going to keep it and re-sell it.
They did sort quite a bit of it and send it out. 
They took the worthless stuff and kept it. I’m 
sure he’s got a warehouse-full of electric frying 
pans right now, and it’s probably just as good he 
did that.
But there were also cases of where a plane would 
land and he would say, "All right, that half of 
the plane is for me, and that half is for the 
people,” so it is really difficult to judge what 
all happened. A lot of the rumors did get started 
where they did the sorting.
By and large, I would say that sixty to seventy 
percent of the stuff that was sent down did get 
out to the people, whether or.not it was of any 
value.
Q: When you say that 60 - 70% of the ’’assistance” got
out, does that mean that 30 to 40% did not?
A: Whether it was kept for personal purposes or
because it was totally Irrelevant is open to 
debate. I would imagine that a lot of it was 
kept for personal purposes by the Somoza Govern­
ment .
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Guatemala
The next disaster in which I worked where food was 
an issue was in Guatemala, after the earthquakes 
of February, 1976.
Q: How long were you associated with the Guatemalan
disaster - how many trips did you make there and 
how many people did you talk with?
A: I’ve been working in Guatemala on and off for about
a year. I arrived shortly after the earthquake and 
stayed for about three months. Then I came back 
again in July, again in August, again in November, 
and now in February and March-.
I worked in the entire Chimaltenango Department 
area - San Martin Jilotepeque, Tecpan, San Jose 
Poaquil, Santa Apolonia, the Comalapa region, then 
up to Joyabaj, Chiche, Chinique. I was an unoffi­
cial advisor to programs in the north up to Cubulco. 
I worked with some extensionists from TACASA who 
were working in the Oriente doing a little housing 
work in Zacapa, Progreso, and that region out 
toward Gualan, which is where the epicenter was, 
and generally in the entire affected region with 
the exception of the area around Rabinal.
In talking with people throughout the country, food 
was always a major issue. When we went to talk to 
the people about housing, they would always ask, 
’’Are you going to bring in food?” And we’d say no. 
’’That’s good,” they’d say, ’’because we’ve got to 
try to sell what we have.” Everyplace, it always 
came up, though we were working in housing and 
didn’t get into the details very much. But I know 
that the people, especially the farmers didn’t 
want the food coming in.
Q: What kinds of people would say this, and in what
parts of Guatemala?
A: These were mostly rural farmers, in all three of
the major affected regions.
Q: Fred, as you know, CARE and Catholic Relief
Services (CRS) brought in more than 25,000 tons of
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relief food after the earthquake. Given the sort 
of feedback which you and other relief workers 
were getting from the small farmers, why do you 
think they went ahead and brought all of this 
food in?
A: God only knows. There certainly wasn’t any kind
of justification for it. It’s incredible to me 
that right after the disaster, the first program 
that CARE had was just to go around issuing food, 
without really thinking. Once again, they’re not 
thinking about what’s necessary.
Q: Does relief food compete with local production?
A: Obviously it does. Basically, it adds additional
quantities of food to the market. People who would 
normally buy food can get it free, so they quit 
buying from the farmers. The farmers therefore 
don’t produce as much. There are two types of 
competition: the type that encourages production,
and the kind that discourages production. Imported 
food in these situations by and large is a negative 
competitor.
When is food necessary and when isn’t it? One of 
the general ways I have of picking whether you 
ought to get involved in food relief is whether 
it’s what I call a ’’one off” disaster -- by which 
I mean that there’s an incident, but starting almost 
immediately everything starts getting better again. 
In an earthquake, you have a big shake and ’’barn”, 
and it may do a lot of damage. But then it's over 
with, and things start moving back to normal again. 
In those types of disasters, you rarely need any 
kind of food. There may be a need for something 
for a few days a soup kitchen, coffee, or some­
thing like that, but most "one off” disasters don't 
destroy the food resources.
Earthquakes don't destroy the food, although they 
may bury it. But that just helps preserve it a 
bit. They don't affect the cycle of planting/ 
growing/harvesting, and so on. They certainly don't 
affect the market. Unless the city is completely
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isolated, the few weeks it takes to clear the 
roads don’t damage the markets. There are inter­
nal markets which can handle a lot of sales and 
re-sales of the food.
If the disaster destroys something like a ware­
house, you don’t want to provide the food -- you 
want to provide the warehouse to store the food to 
keep it from rotting.
There are also what I call ’’continuing disasters”, 
like a war where refugees are on the move and they 
can’t stop to plant and harvest the food. They’ve 
been taken out of the agricultural cycle. In 
those kinds of cases you actually do need to 
provide some sort of food. But there's a point 
where it's got to stop. At the end of the "conti­
nuing disaster”, it becomes essentially the "one 
off” type.
Let me give you an example of what's been going on 
recently in Lebanon.
Lebanon
During this past (1976) Christmas recess, I worked 
in Lebanon. The major food producing region there 
is called the Bekaa Valley. It’s an area northeast 
of Beirut where there’s been limited fighting.
Q: How do you spell that valley?
A: B-e-k-a-a or B-e-c-c-a, or B-e-q-u-a, or B-a-a-ka.
It's either the French spelling, or the English, or 
the Arabic pronunciation or the Texas spelling.
I was over there with the Community Development 
Foundation, which is a branch of Save The Children.
I have been there before to observe the 11.N. Relief 
and Works Agency in the Palestinian camps. This 
time, I was working in the Bekaa Valley.
When there has been fighting there, it's been fair­
ly fierce. Throughout the hostilities, when troops 
and villages were shooting at each other, nobody
14
would go into the fields. Now-the situation is 
different: the fighting has stopped and a cease­
fire is in effect between the parties, especially 
in the Bekaa Valley. Now the farmers want to go 
back and start producing the food again. They 
want to get out in the fields, get the water 
moving through the irrigation channels, and now is 
the planting time.
Here come the agencies again. TheyTve been trying 
to slip food in throughout the war, because they 
knew that nobody was planting or harvesting any­
thing. They made the assumption that everybody 
was going to be starving when the war was over.
In fact, there were food reserves. People were 
able to get food throughout the war. The fighting 
groups were able to buy food in the neighboring 
countries and bring it in.
Now that the war is over, the agencies are coming 
in with a tremendous amount of food. The World 
Food Program is talking about bringing in something 
like 10,000 tons a month. UNICEF will also bring 
in food. Here are two U. N. agencies who are not 
even talking with each other -- both of whom are 
going to bring in food.
At the time I arrived in Lebanon, we were setting 
up an association of foreign agencies, just to try 
to get on record who was bringing what in so every­
body else would know. The CRS man was shocked that 
other agencies were bringing food in. The UNICEF 
man refused to come to the meetings, of course, 
because he was under fire, but also because he felt 
that the World Food Program was treading on his 
territory. There were a lot of inter-agency battles 
going on.
The U. S. Agency for International Development had 
named the Catholic Relief Service (CRS) as their 
official agency for food relief in Lebanon, and 
they will be bringing in massive amounts of bulk 
foods..
When the Government announced that the agencies 
would be bringing in all this food, the farmers out
in the Bekaa Valley said, "Why should we plant 
anything?" While my colleagues and I were working- 
to get agricultural loans and seeds to the farmers 
so they could get the area under cultivation again, 
the farmers were saying, "Why? Look at all the 
food that’s going to come in."
Q: Exactly who will provide all of this food?
Ac The food provided by CRS will come from the U. S.
Government through the Food for Peace Program and, 
indirectly, the U.S. Agency for International 
Development.
The food from UNICEF will come from their reserves, 
a large part of which, I think are provided by 
Canada and Australia,- and of course a lot from 
the United States,
The World Food Program will apply their standard 
levy to the producing countries, asking them for 
food. They’ve got some stored in various places.
Q: Certainly, international agencies are carrying out
food prog-rams with humanitarian intents. Why do 
they use these kinds of traditional approaches to 
relief work, in light of all of this experience?
A: The problem is that they’re not sensitive to the
real cause and effect relationships.
The vast majority of people who have worked in 
disasters are not trained disaster personnel. They’re 
voluntary agency staff members who happen to be there 
when the disaster strikes, and are relied on to make 
the decisions. Most of them had never had any prepa­
ration for these decisions and how to make them.
So they seek -out the traditional ways of responding. 
The leaders of the agencies have never had any real 
field experience —  they don’t know what’s going on 
in the affected areas.
By the time someone questions the programs, the 
agencies are too locked into them. Let’s say the 
agency admits that "We’ve been distributing millions
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of pounds of grain down here; it’s all rotting; 
people don’t like it, and we’re just increasing 
the problem.” No agency’s going to put that in 
a report to its donors. They just quietly bury 
it.
A lot of these agencies have known for a long time 
that their programs don’t work. However, they 
respond to pressures not only from their own donors 
but from the countries they’re working in.
Local governments sometimes don’t have any better 
idea than the agencies of what’s going on in the 
field. But they like to use relief aid. It’s an 
expeditious means of getting resources and shift­
ing the responsibility for their own problems onto 
the international agencies.
Q: Which are the biggest agencies?
A: CARE has probably had more experience in providing
free food than any agency in the world. They go 
way back to World War II and the reconstruction of 
Europe, especially the CARE packages, the DP camps, 
and so forth. They’ve never learned their lesson: 
they’re making the same mistakes they’ve always 
made. They never seem to chart any kind of patterns 
or look at the major issues involved.
They’re more concerned with providing a good image 
to Americans you know, being really helpful and 
providing assistance to people -- without looking 
at the ramifications of what it’s going to do down 
the line.
Q: Why?
A: They’re too big, for one thing. CARE is also really
locked into providing free assistance. Their entire 
advertising campaign is based around giving money 
for welfare for poor people in the developing coun­
tries. Because of this policy, they can't sell the 
food or other materials when it is appropriate.
I’ve-heard their Director, Frank Goffio, talk about 
why he has to keep doing this. I guess it's more 
important to him to have the money coming in than
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to worry about where it’s going or what it's doing.
Most Americans feel that CARE is working in prima­
rily charity cases. There’s still a lot of feeling 
that all CARE does is distribute CARE packages.
It’s very difficult for the person living in the 
United States to understand what’s going on out 
here. There’s little attempt by CARE, for example, 
to inform the American public about what’s really 
happening.
When there’s a disaster, people respond. They 
especially want to do something to help the poor.
The agencies they know of are the'ones that adver­
tise the most: CARE, Save The Children, Catholic
Relief Services, CARITAS, and so forth. Many 
agencies believe that- if the food or other materials 
they buy are not handed-out for free, their donors 
would not be in agreement.
My parents are good examples. They believe that 
CARE comes in after a disaster, provides some 
emergency things, and gets out. They don’t realize 
that CARE stays in these countries for years and 
years and years.
What is always Interesting to me is that the average 
American who doesn’t like welfare, will turn around 
the next minute and support that idea in a develop­
ing country.
Q: Have any of the agencies learned anything over the
years?
A: Depends on the agency.
Critical reports on the activities of some of the 
bigger agencies, such as CRS and CARITAS, have had 
very little effect. There have been, a large number 
of reports indicating to them the futility of some 
of their food aid, going back as far as 1972, when 
I saw the first report questioning the importation 
of food by UNICEF in Bangladesh. Within the 
large agencies, the directors just don’t feel that 
the feedback they’re getting from the field is valid. 
They typically ’’know” there’s starvation -- there­
fore, they’ll send in U. S. food. They’re locked
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into a system they canTt get out of.
With the smaller agencies, it?s been just the 
opposite. My own feeling is that the smaller the 
agency, the more effective it is. The small groups, 
like the American Friends Service Committee, World 
Neighbors, Mennonite Central Committee, and others, 
using indigenous resources, really get into the 
field and work with the people. They tend to see 
the problems much quicker and have largely gotten 
away from .mass food distribution.
The Mennonites in Bangladesh insisted that they 
would not import anything and would accept no food 
aid or food-for-work programs, even in the refugee 
camps they were working in. They encouraged people 
to convert all possible land to growing. They did 
fantastic projects there. They took the two-way 
roads, cut them down the middle, and used the other 
half for growing food. With pathways, they asked 
everybody to walk single file and took the other 
part of the path to grow food.
They made the camps they were working in self- 
sufficient. It was a much better approach.
It’s always interesting at U.N. conferences what 
the different groups feel the priorities are - 
what the Governments feel are priorities, what the 
agencies feel are priorities, and what the more 
independent specialists in the field feel are 
priorities. The independents are saying, "No more 
food." The agencies are saying, "Well, food where 
it’s appropriate," but then they go ahead and flood 
every disaster area where it’s appropriate or not. 
The Governments are saying, "Send us more food."
Q: Nevertheless, Fred, the fact remains that in many
of these countries -- in Guatemala, for example -- 
there is a high degree of malnutrition. People 
may not be starving to death, but they are mal­
nourished. In non-disaster or in disaster periods, 
a humanitarian agency comes along and wants to feed 
these hungry people.
A: It’s a very difficult problem. There is often a
lack of hard evidence on either side to verify or
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deny the claims, and the visual impact for some­
body who sees a child starving on the street 
overrides whatever arguments are made against 
food imports.
But you can show, I think, fairly well now that 
the importation of food in a give-away program 
has a damaging effect. It takes somebody who is 
really hard-nosed to ask, "What is actually best?" 
and try to work it out. But I think the experience 
we’ve had over the last few years shows that donor 
foods have a negative impact. It’s a matter of 
facing up to that.
My overall impression is that’ food aid has got to 
be concentrated on helping people provide their 
own food, and that technical assistance, not food 
imports, is needed. The importation of food is 
almost always a negative factor.
There is a lot of discussion going around now in 
the field of development about what’s called the 
"lifeboat” approach. That’s just saying that some­
times you have to write .off a certain percentage 
of the people, or a certain number of countries, 
to start the development process, I don’t believe 
in that approach. But I do think there’s a time 
when you have to do what the Mennonite Central 
Committee does and say: "No more of this imported 
food type of aid. We’ll stop and have to accept 
the fact that a certain number of people are going 
to be adversely affected. We’re going to con­
centrate on a positive program that in the long run 
is going to be the best thing." Once you start the 
process of giving people food, housing, and other 
things, you’re entering a vicious cycle and you 
can’t get out of it.
Very often, what you want to do is improve the 
diets of people who are malnourished. There’s been 
a lot of research done on that, and, just as in 
housing, it’s a question of starting on what people 
have. If you start with beans and rice, the thing 
is to make sure people have enough beans and rice, 
and then to think in terms of adding something to 
that diet to enrich it. Maybe a few peppers, as
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they do in Guatemala. So you start where the 
people are rather than coming in with exotic 
foreign supplementary foods.
Many people believe that when there’s been a 
disaster, the victims will eat anything (because 
they're starving). Therefore much of the food aid 
is inappropriate. Not only is the food not liked 
by the recipients, they often don’t know how to 
prepare it. And, in some cases of course, the food 
is a cultural insult, for example, canned pork sent 
to Muslim communities. More important, from the 
relief workers’ standpoint, as well as the victims', 
imported foods may actually be harmful. You've 
probably heard the stories of how canned sweet 
potatoes sent to Honduras after Fifi gave the victims 
diarrhea and how milk and milk powder caused an 
increase in medical problems in Africa. But this is 
even true in the basic foods. If you change the 
food routine of someone who has only been eating 
several food items all his life, his system will 
react. New foods must be introduced slowly.
Q: Food-for-work programs are often used after a disaster
as a means of organizing people and making sure they 
have food. Is this a good way of providing it?
Food-for-work may be an incentive to getting some­
thing done immediately, but again you have to look 
at the long-term implications. Eventually, you're 
going to have to provide a means for continuing 
that input or you're going to disrupt the local 
economic system when you take it out. The World 
Food Program/Bangladesh people and others asked,
"Why not pay people in cash for work?" People 
are doing a hell of a lot of honest work; why 
shouldn't they get an honest day's wages for it.
If they receive cash, they can decide what they're 
going to do with it. In Bangladesh, there was 
food around to buy if they wanted it, and a cash 
payment for work reinforces the self-reliance of 
each person.
Q: So what criteria would you suggest be followed in
considering PL480 or other donations of food to 
developing countries?
A: I think there are several issues you have to
consider as a relief agency after a disaster - and
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many of them would apply to non-disaster situations 
as well.
The first question is: Is the food really needed?
It takes an understanding of the event that caused 
the disaster and whether it destroyed the food 
sources. You have to find out how much food is 
available in the country and its surroundings and 
how it is produced. You have to ask yourself: is
it needed? Not only, is food in general needed? 
but is the type you’re going to bring in really 
needed.
The second issue is: Would the imported food be
productive of counterproductive? That's a hard one 
to analyz’e for any agency. The only thing you have 
to go by is past performance, which indicates that 
in most cases it’s counterproductive. You have to 
understand how and when the food is grown, how it’s 
paid for, who markets and buys it, and who all are 
involved from the time the seed goes into the 
ground until it gets on someone’s table. You have 
to ascertain how much of the food produced stays in 
the local community, how much leaves, and where It 
goes when it leaves.
The third issue is: How do you provide the food?
Again, it comes down to the choices: are you
going to feed people, or are you going to encourage 
people to grow the food themselves? The obvious 
thing for me in every case is to encourage people 
to grow It themselves rather than trying to feed 
people. You have to realize what a feeding program 
does to a person. We talked earlier about what it 
does to his/her self-esteem, identity and every­
thing else.
The next question is: Where do you draw the line?
How many people are you going to try to reach and 
what are you going to try to do? A blanket approach 
is generally the worst way. You’ve got to start 
a small program and grow outward. Coming in with 
a big, unmanageable project is a waste of time and 
effort on everybody’s part, and is going to be the 
most counterproductive type of project.
I think the final question you’ve got to ask is:
Whom will it serve? This is a really hard one to 
ask. Are you serving the interests of the people
22
who will receive the food, or are you serving 
the interests of disposing of surplus food, keeping 
a government in power, or other interests? If you 
are serving the interests of the people, you must 
go back and ask the second question again: is it
a productive or counterproductive program?
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